

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DCI/ICS-86-0976
17 December 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: Executive Secretary
SCI Forum

SUBJECT: Minutes of Third Meeting, SCI Forum, 2 December 1986 []

25X1

1. The following is to record events taking place during the SCI Forum meeting of 2 December 1986 in Room 6100, Department of Justice, 1300-1440 hours. Personnel present were: []

Clark Dittmer, State
Bill O'Donnell, Treasury

[]
George Henriksen, Navy
Tom Chace, State
Mark Pelensky, Navy

[]
William Cody, Air Force

[]
Walter Breede, Marine Corps

Maynard Anderson, OSD
Gene Bacher, DoE
Charles Alliman, DoJ

[]
Maurice H. Ralston, OSD

[]
Claudia Smith, Army
Ted Konduris, Air Force

[]
Gary Stoops, FBI

25X1
25X1

25X1
25X1

25X1

25X1
25X1

2. Distributed at the meeting were:

a. NSA-originated information memorandum to NSC Staff re national polygraph program to protect SCI.

b. NSA-originated amendment to DCID 1/14 re polygraph program.

c. CIA information/instruction document re ORCON, NOCONTRACT, and other controls.

25X1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

d. Justice Department memo to D/Security/NSA re proposals offered in a. and b. above (national polygraph program).

25X1 e. Navy memo proposing modification of DCID 1/21 to require SCIF inspections at a minimum of every two years vice annually. []

3. In response to the moderator's request for acceptance of the minutes of the 30 October meeting, the group registered approval. It was noted that [] of NSA was listed as in attendance but, in fact, was absent from that meeting. []

25X1
25X1

4. The first matter considered was that of the ORCON controls as contained in DCID 1/7. The CIA representative introduced [] [] to state their agency's position. [] distributed the document identified as c. above and offered a verbal explanation and elaboration on the content of the document. He described the mechanism followed in obtaining relief from the ORCON control. All requests are handled by the Intelligence Dissemination Branch of the Directorate of Operations. The control is determined by field and headquarters elements in coordination. It was stressed that foreign liaison services also put caveats on information they supply. [] also emphasized that information controlled is often the product of clandestine acquisition which, by its nature, requires strict control. He added that the Agency is totally willing to disseminate controlled information to field commanders based on proper justification. He stated the objective is to facilitate the use of information by those who need it, particularly with respect to timely dissemination of terrorist threat information. [] reiterated the practice of manning an office 24 hours a day to answer requests for ORCON relief. The matter of that office not being responsive was resolved with the telephone numbers identified in the paragraph 2.c. handout. It had earlier been ascertained that some elements seeking relief had been calling the CIA 24-hour Security Duty Office rather than the Directorate of Operations Watch Office. [] explained that the desk officers must sometimes query the office responsible for the information, inferring that their decisionmaking authority was limited. After hours, this could entail calling officers at home and, in some rare cases, could require contact with officers abroad. [] added that there was special concern regarding "exclusive for" information. He cited as an example when NSA sends material to CIA with the "exclusive for" caveat, NSA is implicitly trusting the recipient with any further dissemination based on that officer's judgment in exercise of need to know. As a final point in his remarks about ORCON, [] said he was concerned about what is entered into data bases, even in his own organization (CIA). [] cited the fact that this ORCON matter had been with us for years as a matter of contention, and he had a memorandum from the Chairman of SECDEF dated May 1986 saying that SECDEF had agreed to return to the language of the earlier (1976) DCID 1/7 relative to ORCON. []

25X1
25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1
25X1

25X1

5. The OSD representative expressed reservation about the ORCON language referenced by [] He said there is no question about recognizing the need for DDO and the Agency to protect certain sensitive information, but a problem exists sometimes in getting permission quickly at unusual hours,

25X1

particularly, for example, if the Secretary of Defense wants to see the material and won't be satisfied with a verbal account. Mr. Anderson stated that the result is the information is provided without requesting release from the originator. [] declared there was no objection to release to department heads and cabinet members, but he was worried about further dissemination beyond that. He remarked that his agency has an excellent relationship with JCS and J-2 elements regarding ORCON controls and procedures for relief, and he added that if there are any DoD or other elements that need CIA information and are not getting it, he wants to know in order to rectify the situation. The OSD representative concluded by saying his organization was not having a big problem, and he suggested the Services direct any problems to CIA themselves. He suggesting letting the ORCON situation remain as is in consideration of the foregoing remarks. The ORCON matter was concluded with the moderator charging the executive secretary with responsibility to send out the revised language and definition of "headquarters elements" to Forum members with requests for concurring remarks by 20 December. The CIA representative was charged to work in coordination of this effort. []

25X1

25X1

6. The next matter for discussion was the DIA memorandum dated 13 June 1986 which had been transmitted to all members along with the scheduled agenda for this meeting. The memo addresses NOCONTRACT controls in DCID 1/7. The DIA representative offered an abbreviated explanation of the rationale for and text of the memo. The moderator asked for clarification and elaboration for further understanding. The DIA representative then explained one area that was particularly troublesome which involved data base files in the system high mode. Such a data base contains all control caveats. Many of the files are of vintage origin, e.g., 10 or 20 years old that do not permit identification of the originator from whom DIA can request relief. Whenever the originator is identifiable, DIA will request approval for contractor release. The moderator explained that the originator, in turn, must ask just who the recipients will be, how the material will be used, etc. He added that he can understand that certain information could carry the NOCONTRACT control when entered into a data base, but later cannot be justified similarly when standing alone. The DoE representative reminded the group that the NOCONTRACT control was to prevent a contractor from gaining a competitive edge, to which [] remarked that the other reason for the control was the protection of sources and/or methods. He added his concern about dilution of the DCID 1/7 intent with dilution of the control. (As an aside, more to the point of ADP security controls, he remarked that protection of controlled information will be more difficult if we don't limit introduction of more PCs and their access to our data bases.) Discussion on this NOCONTRACT matter continued with diverse concepts of "internal" and "external" contractors. The DIA representative again supported that agency's memo with the example wherein DIA gets a validated and approved request to send magnetic tapes to a contractor for a particular study. The tapes are dated, and the originators of some NOCONTRACT information cannot be identified. In the past, DIA would request release approval from SECOM; now they would seek Forum approval. The moderator pointed out that since data systems containing such information will have many sources and originators, multiple requests will be required. At present, DIA makes hard copies of the material at issue and sends it to

25X1

identified originators with request for release approval in instances of both ORCON and NOCONTRACT. The moderator asked for members to express their concurrence or otherwise comment on the DIA proposal. Consensus was for approval of the DIA concept expressed in its memo (6 concur, 3 neutral, 2 non-concur). The moderator offered that the memo does not address the "in house" contractors. The CIA representative said this could be accommodated in the DCID language. [] CIA/OGC, offered that certain types of contractors/consultants should be considered as extensions of the employing office or department, and the basis to be considered is in the control over contractors. [] opined that no specific language can be devised to satisfy the problem. The moderator stated that as a forum we must work with and within the DCIDs. He charged CIA and DIA, with assistance from [] to reach an agreement on acceptable language to incorporate the intent of the DIA memo into the DCID 1/7 language. The moderator asked that the agreed upon language be sent to members in time for their comments to be returned to the executive secretary by 20 December 1986. []

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

7. The NSA-proposed revision to DCID 1/19, paragraph 35.h. was discussed next. The OSD representative registered his objection to the proposed language, maintaining that the elements who sponsored the contractors' accesses had need to monitor the travel and visits of contractors under their cognizance. The NSA principal said he understood that position, but such was not a security function and time did not permit the monitoring of the large number of visits taking place between government and contractor facilities. The executive secretary offered comments designed to persuade the OSD representative that the proposed language could be acceptable to him. OSD responded, saying he would not formally object to the language going into the DCID, but OSD practices regarding contractor visits would not change and therefore would not be in literal conformity with the proposed language. The moderator charged the executive secretary to work with NSA and OSD to reach agreement on language acceptable to both. []

25X1

8. The 18 June 1986 DIA memo re DCID 1/19 was discussed next.

- DIA withdrew its stand objecting to total document control over facsimile materials.
- A consensus poll resulted in approval of requirement for subparagraph marking.
- Questions on the SCI control manual should be addressed to the executive secretary of this Forum when unanswerable by security authorities within Intelligence Community organizations.
- Members agreed to delete "the vulnerabilities of" language in paragraph 9, subparagraph b. []

25X1

9. Considerable discussion ensued on the next topic, the NSA-proposed memo to NSC re the Forum support for a polygraph program. Various views were presented, and agreement was reached on modified language. Relative to the

proposal for a polygraph policy related annex to DCID 1/14, the NSA representative again stated his supporting rationale, but several members objected. The moderator stated that the matter of the DCID would be placed in abeyance until the next meeting. ☐

25X1

10. The Navy representative requested Forum members' agreement to a proposed change in DCID 1/21 which would alter the requirement for SCIF inspections from annual to once every two years. The Navy representative cited a lack of qualified personnel resources to continue the formal inspections annually at their increasingly high number of facilities. Navy suggested that the other services were facing the same problem. The moderator requested that the Working Group (carried over from SECOM) pursue this request further and again bring it to the Forum if agreement cannot be reached within that body. ☐

25X1

11. The moderator declared that current agreed upon versions of DCID 1/7 and DCID 1/19 should be circulated among members in time for coordination and approval at the next meeting. ☐

25X1

12. NSA provided a memo dated 28 November 1986 recommending revisions to DCIDs 1/7 and 1/19. Time did not permit dissemination and discussion of the memo. Copies are attached for review and acceptance or rejection at the next meeting. ☐

25X1


13. A summary of action items follows:

- CIA, working with the executive secretary, is to prepare revised language relative to ORCON and a definition of "headquarters elements" for inclusion in DCID 1/7. Product to be sent to members for concurrence responses to CCISCMS by 20 December 1986.
- CIA, working in coordination with DIA and the CIA/OGC representative, is to prepare language for DCID 1/7 relative to NOCONTRACT controls for transmittal to members for concurrence responses by 20 December.
- The executive secretary is to prepare a revised version of the NSA proposed memo to the NSC from the Forum stating support in the concept of NSDD 196. Product is to be ready for the next meeting.
- The executive secretary is to work with NSA and OSD to arrive at acceptable language for paragraph 35.h. in DCID 1/19.
- The executive secretary is to send DCID 1/7 and 1/19 with accepted revisions to date for coordination and approval at the next meeting.

☐

25X1

14. The next Forum meeting is scheduled for 1300 hours, 12 January 1986, in Room 6100 Main Justice, 10th and Constitution, NW. Attendees are requested



25X1

Attachment:
a/s

CONFIDENTIAL

CCISCMS/ICS:A0 [redacted]

25X1

Distribution of DCI/ICS-86-0976 (w/att as stated):

- 1 - Maynard C. Anderson, OSD
- 1 - Maurice Ralston, OSD
- 1 - Carl L. Bjorkman, Army
- 1 - George Henriksen, Navy
- 1 - William C. Cody, Air Force
- 1 - Walter J. Breede, Marine Corps

1 - [redacted]

25X1

- 1 - Gary L. Stoops, FBI
- 1 - Clark M. Dittmer, State
- 1 - David Major, NSC

1 - [redacted]

25X1

- 1 - Jerry Rubino, Justice
- 1 - Stephen E. Bacher, DoE
- 1 - William O'Donnell, Treasury
- 1 - ICS Registry
- 1 - CCISCMS subject
- 1 - D/CCISCMS chrono

CONFIDENTIAL